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How much does journal reputation tell us about the academic
interest and relevance of economic research? 
Empirical analysis and implications for environmental economic
research 
Abstract
Unlike in other disciplines, research output in economics is commonly measured based on the
disciplinary reputation of the journals in which an author has published. Here, I examine how much
output measures based on journal reputation tell us about the academic interest and relevance of
economic papers as measured by frequency of citation. Using data from the 2008 Handelsblatt ranking
of economists in German speaking countries and interdisciplinary citation data from the Web of
Science, I find that researcher scores based on journal reputation explain only about 30 percent of the
variation (variance) in article citations. When the top 10 (20) percent of the researchers according to
journal reputation scores are excluded, the percentage of explained variation in citation frequency drops
to 8 (3) percent. Furthermore, using environmental economics journals as an example, I show that the
traditional output measures strongly discourage applied and interdisciplinary economic research. The
findings confirm that the traditional output measures provide incentives for narrow economic work even
if that work is of interest to only few other researchers. Responsible hiring committees and funding
institutions should take these problems seriously and re-consider existing standards in the evaluation of
economic research.
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Abstract 
 
Unlike in other disciplines, research output in economics is commonly measured based on the 
disciplinary reputation of the journals in which an author has published. Here, I examine how 
much output measures based on journal reputation tell us about the academic interest and 
relevance of economic papers as measured by frequency of citation. Using data from the 2008 
Handelsblatt ranking of economists in German speaking countries and interdisciplinary 
citation data from the Web of Science, I find that researcher scores based on journal reputation 
explain only about thirty percent of the variation (variance) in article citations. When the top 
10 (20) percent of the researchers according to journal reputation scores are excluded, the 
percentage of explained variation in citation frequency drops to 8 (3) percent. Furthermore, 
using environmental economics journals as an example, I show that the traditional output 
measures strongly discourage applied and interdisciplinary economic research. The findings 
confirm that the traditional output measures provide incentives for narrow economic work 
even if that work is of interest to only few other researchers. Responsible hiring committees 
and funding institutions should take these problems seriously and re-consider existing 
standards in the evaluation of economic research. 
 
Keywords: citation index, incentives, interdisciplinarity, publication, research evaluation, 
scientometrics 
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The use of citation frequency as a sole or main criterion for measuring researcher productivity 
is being increasingly criticised (e.g. Adler et al. 2008). Key issues with citations based 
measures include their limited potential to reflect an article’s interest and relevance outside 
academia and the problem that these measures can provide incentives for unproductive herd 
behaviour and “citation cartels” in research. Furthermore, it is often argued that the coverage 
of sources by the existing citation databases is not sufficiently objective or comprehensive 
(see e.g. Winiwarter and Luhmann 2009, Mocikat 2009 in recent articles in this journal). 
These issues are of even greater concern where evaluations are based on citation measures at 
the journal level (i.e., impact factors) rather than on individual article citations (Mocikat 
2009). 
In a reply to Winiwarter and Luhman and Mocikat, Nentwich (2009) acknowledges 
important problems with citations based measures of research output but also argues that 
some of the criticism misses the mark. Most importantly, perhaps, the resulting incentives for 
publishing in an (internationally) visible and accessible form can be seen as inherently 
desirable, and the relevance and translation for the world outside academia may be seen as a 
separate problem on which competing measures may not fare any better. Furthermore, 
Nentwich (p. 281) suggests that the “distorting mirror of citations” can promote reflection on 
how scientific output is measured and may thus be a positive trigger of change. 
Can citations based measures be a healthy challenge to existing standards in academic 
research? One way to look into this is by empirically comparing the implications of 
alternative approaches in research evaluation. A field of inquiry where research output is not 
measured based on article citations is economics. In economics, the measurement of research 
output relies on the number of articles and an expert rating of the journals in which these 
articles are published. In this system, a small number of authoritative insiders define journal 
quality and reputation through a subjective weighting of journals and at the same time act as 
gate-keepers who decide what is accepted for publication in the most reputable journals 
(Laband and Tollison 2003, Oswald 2007). Hence, the success of an individual article is 
defined solely, and ultimately, by the reputation of the journal in which it is published—quite 
regardless of its further fate among its audience in the scientific community.  
Since citations, in contrast, play virtually no role in the evaluation of economic 
research output, any rational economist who wishes to survive and succeed in academia 
should focus on publishing in high-reputation journals – and sacrifice the objectives of 
relevance and interest (as measured by future citations) in his or her research. Of course, one 
would expect that the researchers who publish most successfully in terms of journal 
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reputation are also those who are most relevant and interesting. However, if there are 
tradeoffs between the two objectives, it could also happen that research output based on 
journal reputation is only weakly, if at all, associated with output based on citations. This is a 
testable hypothesis. If it is confirmed, the finding would imply that the incentives introduced 
by the existing output measures do not encourage interesting and widely relevant work. 
Originating from a time when citation data were unavailable, these output measures would 
thus be highly insufficient from a societal and efficiency perspective.  
Here, I examine this hypothesis empirically. Specifically, I investigate the relationship 
between a well known traditional measure of researcher output based on expert-rated journal 
reputation – the Handelsblatt-Ranking of economists in German speaking countries1 – with 
the same authors’ citation rates in Web-of-Science-listed journals. The following specific 
questions are addressed: 
(1) How much of the variation in researchers’ number of citations is explained by their 
score based on journal reputation? 
(2) How strong is the association between researcher rank based on citations and 
researcher rank based on journal reputation scores? 
We find that these relationships are very weak, confirming the hypothesis that the 
traditional measurement of research output in economics produces problematic incentives and 
should for this reason be abandoned by universities and funding institutions as a sole or major 
indicator of research quality. 
 
Economic journal weighting schemes and resulting incentives 
In economics, a variety of journal weighting schemes have been proposed (see e.g. Kodrzycki 
and Yu 2006). The Handelsblatt, in weighting the journals, borrows from the two probably 
most established European journal rankings, the “Tinbergen list” and the weighting scheme 
developed by Combes and Linnemer (2003). Each of these is based on a subjective weighting 
of journals by selected experts.  
The Tinbergen list, developed by the Tinbergen Institute in Rotterdam (NL) classifies 
journals as “generally accepted top-level journals” (AA), “very good journals covering 
economics in general and the top journals in each field” (A), and “good journals for all 
research fields within the Tinbergen Institute”. These fields cover “economics, econometrics, 
                                                 
1 Since 2010, the Handelsblatt-Ranking is based on the database Forschungsmonitoring which has been enacted 
by the  Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association) and is administered by the KOF Swiss 
Economic Institute of the Federal Institute of Technology ETH according to guidelines set by the Newspaper 
Handelsblatt. The ranking is thus officially endorsed by a large academic association and a large publicly funded 
research institution. 
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finance, operations research, marketing and accounting”. On its website, which also displays 
the resulting journal weights, the Tinbergen Institute describes the classification as follows:2 
The classification is based on objective rankings, supported by the judgement of experts. Important inputs have 
been: SSCI and SCI impact factors, the ranking by Kalaitzidakis, P. et al.. 2003. "Ranking of Academic Journals 
and Institutions in Economics", Journal of the European Economic Association: 1 (6), pp. 1346-66, and a more 
recent 'within economics' ranking by Kodrzycki, Y. and P. Yu (2006) "New Approaches to Ranking Economics 
Journals," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 24. 
The weighting scheme by Combes and Linnemer (2003) was developed for the European 
Economic Association (EEA) to rank the leading European economics departments. The 
weighting is described as follows (Combes and Linnemer 2003, p. 4): 
 
We built an original journal weighting scheme denoted CL that weights all EconLit journals from 1 to 1/12. 
After a long and repetitive procedure which started in 1998 (...) we divided the EconLit journals in six groups. 
First, top journals are significantly differentiated from other ones with a weight equal to 1. A weight of 8/12 only 
is given to the next 16 journals. Then, a series of 39 journals are weighted 6/12, 68 journals 4/12, 138 journals 
2/12 and all remaining journals 1/12 (...). 
Our choices, which could be discussed endlessly as more than 800 journals are considered, tried to be 
consistent with citation/impact indicators when they are available. We do not think, however, that these have to 
be followed blindly. Independently of the journal average quality, the number of citations can vary from one 
field to the other and from a young journal to an older one. To counter this kind of effects, in any case, we tried 
to put at least 6/12 to any journal which is a leader in its field. Conversely, we did not put 8/12 or more to a 
journal too specialized. We do not believe that our scheme is perfect but the centre rankings proved to be very 
robust to moderate changes in weights even if such changes could be important at the individual level. 
 
Evidently, this description is not very precise about when exactly the impact factors were not 
“followed blindly”.3 Furthermore, reputation scores may be a highly noisy signal of individual 
article quality, and its use as a sole or main measure of research output may produce a number 
of problematic incentives beyond those of output measures based on article citations. At least 
four additional problems can be identified (Table 1). 
First, journal reputation may be a very noisy signal of the quality of individual 
articles. Previous research has demonstrated a large overlap of article citation rates among 
journals with higher and lower reputations (Laband and Tollison 2003, Starbuck 2005, 
                                                 
2 www.tinbergen.nl/research-institute/journal-classification.php (accessed November 18, 2009). 
3 Based on all 125 journals included in the 2008 Handelsblatt-Ranking and the 2008 Journal Citation Reports 
(category Economics), the 2-year impact factor explains only 20 percent and the 5-year impact factor 26 percent 
of the Handelsblatt journal weights. 
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Oswald 2007). Measurement based on journal reputation thus provides powerful incentives 
for wasteful investments in repeated submissions to top journals. 
Second, it is well known that papers can be purposefully written to please the editors 
and reviewers of the journal to which they are submitted. Articles are more likely to be 
accepted in highly ranked economics journals if they largely support, rather than challenge, 
received wisdom (Frey 2003). Hence, measures based on journal reputation may discourage 
innovative work that may not be accepted in highly ranked journals but would be frequently 
cited (even in a “lower” journal).  
Third, as many economists perceive technicality and mathematical sophistication as 
signals of high-quality research, journal reputation scores may reflect and promote those 
qualities.4  
Finally, since articles published in journals of related disciplines are not ”counted”, the 
economic output measures provide powerful and virtually irresistible incentives for a purely 
disciplinary orientation in publishing. (As a matter of fact, the authors of some economic 
weighting schemes seem to have quite willingly cultivated a narrow disciplinary orientation.5) 
In sum, output measures based on journal reputation may provide incentives for 
economic research that is technically sophisticated, supportive of prior work and close to the 
core of the discipline – at a possible expense of relevance, interest, originality and innovation. 
 
Data and measures 
Output measure based on journal reputation scores 
On 22 September 2008, the German newspaper Handelsblatt published the 2008 edition of its 
ranking of the “top 200” active economists at research institutions in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland, based on their lifetime publication output. Furthermore, the newspaper issued a 
ranking of the “top 100” researchers based on articles published in 2004 through 2008. 
The Handelsblatt ranking is based on research output in 220 journals in the fields of 
economics and statistics, weighted according to a combination of the two schemes described 
above. Five top journals obtain the value 1, the remaining journals obtain values between 0.67 
and 0.2 points. A list with the journals and their scores is available on the Internet6. Short 
                                                 
4 In discussing the origins of the recent economic crisis, Paul Krugman (2009) argues that “the economics 
profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, 
for truth.” 
5 Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) who analyze the influence of economic journals state: “Economists, being a 
rather narrow-minded and self-centered group, are probably more concerned with a journal’s impact on the 
economic profession (than on other disciplines).” 
6 www.handelsblatt.com/_t=dgtool,id=15,obj=1;singleclip (accessed 18 November, 2009). 
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research notes and comments count half the value of regular articles. Book reviews, replies 
and corrections are not counted. 
The journal score received by the author of an article is calculated by the formula 
2p/(n+1), where p is the point value of the journal and n the number of authors of the article. 
Points are summed over articles to obtain a researcher’s total score. The dataset relies on 
researcher-reported article lists. The article lists of all researchers (with journal points of each 
article) are published on the Internet, such that misrepresentation is unlikely. 
 
Output measure based on citations 
For all authors listed in the Handelsblatt ranking lists, the 2008 citation data were researched 
from the Web of Science database in May 2009, using the “search” and “cited reference 
search” tools.7,8 Where an author’s work could not be unambiguously identified by his or her 
last name and initial(s), we used his or her publication list to exclude articles from other 
authors. In the cases where we could proceed with the efficient “cited reference search” tool 
(since no or only few papers from other authors with identical name and initials had to be 
manually excluded), the citation numbers also include citations to articles that are not listed 
themselves in the Web of Science. In the remaining cases, where we used the “search” tool, 
the citations include only those to articles referenced in the Web of Science. Due to resource 
constraints, and since the citations to non-Web of Science-listed publications are only a small 
fraction of the total, we chose to tolerate this (unsystematic) measurement error.  
 
                                                 
7 The analysis is based on the citation data of a single year since the random variation of individual citation 
numbers over time (years) tends to be small. Nevertheless, using data from several consecutive years might be 
appropriate to remove some of the random variation in future research. 
8 http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-z/web_of_science (accessed May 4, 
2010) 
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Results 
Relationship between score based on journal reputation and scores based on number of 
citations 
Figure 1a shows scatter plots of the “top 200” researchers’ numbers of citations in 2008 and 
their lifetime scores (all articles) based on journal reputation as published in the Handelsblatt 
ranking. Visual inspection suggests that the correlation between the two measures is relatively 
weak. Many of the “top” researchers in the Handelsblatt ranking are cited relatively rarely. 
On the other hand, there are some apparent “second rate” researchers whose work apparently 
makes a substantive impact on the literature. 
To quantify how much of the variation in citations can be explained by the 
Handelsblatt scores, the citation measure was regressed on the journal score to obtain the R2 
values (explained variation in the linear model) and the respective P-values (from testing the 
restriction that the coefficient on “journal score” is zero). The data were not log-transformed 
due to the occurrence of zero values in the citation variable. (The original data are available 
from the author on request.) 
Table 2 (upper part) summarizes these results. In the linear model, the journal 
reputation score explains 30.7 percent of the variation in citation rates. However, much of this 
explanatory power is due to a small number of top researchers. When the top 10 (20) percent 
of researchers (based on Handelsblatt scores) are omitted, the percentage of explained 
variation drops to 7.8 (3.3) percent. Hence, if the Handelsblatt ranking is used to compare the 
research output of candidates within the lower 80 percent of the distribution, relevance and 
interest as measured by citations is almost completely discounted. 
One might object that lifetime journal scores may be only weakly correlated with 2008 
citations, since older articles might not be cited any more in 2008 (although articles citing 
those articles might still be). To entertain this possibility, I also examined the relationship 
between journal scores from publications in 2004 through 2008 and citations to articles 
published in 2004 through 2008 (Figure 1b). The finding is similar. The percentages of 
explained variation are even somewhat smaller, ranging from 10.8 percent for the full sample 
to 2.5 percent when the top 20 percent of researchers are omitted (Table 2, lower part). 
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Relationship between rank based on journal reputation scores and rank based on citations 
How do these numbers translate into researcher ranks? For illustrative purposes, I also plotted 
rank based on journal scores (Handelsblatt rank) against rank based on citations (Figure 2)9. 
The Handelsblatt ranks based on lifetime journal score and 2008 citations to all articles are 
shown in Figure 2a. The data for the journal score of articles published in 2004 through 2008 
and the citations in 2008 to articles published in 2004 through 2008 are shown in Figure 2b. 
Again, the scatter plots shows that the Handelsblatt ranks are a very poor predictor of 
researcher ranks based on number of citations. 
 
Implications for disciplinary and interdisciplinary environmental research 
Concerning the focus of this journal, it is easy to show that the traditional economic standard 
in measuring research output also has adverse implications specifically for economists 
interested in disciplinary and interdisciplinary environmental research. In addition to the 
problem that contributions in journals of other disciplines are ignored in the traditional output 
measures (see above), the disciplinary and interdisciplinary environmental economics journals 
which publish mainly applied work are greatly underweighted in the relevant journal 
weighting schemes.10 
This is illustrated in Table 3 for those 13 environmental economics journals which are 
included in the Handelsblatt ranking. For instance, the journal Ecological Economics ranks 
among the top 15% of the economics journals in terms of its 5-year Web-of-Science impact. 
Nevertheless, the journal receives a very low score in the disciplinary rankings, including the 
Handelsblatt ranking described below, where the journal weight of 0.2 suggests a rank 
somewhere in the bottom 25% of the economics journals. Among the environmental 
economics journals, only those three ranking highest (according to the traditional measures) 
receive weights that are approximately proportionate to their impacts on the literature. 
(Incidentally, those three are journals with a preference for theoretical and highly technical 
articles). 
The implications for economists interested in disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
environmental research are straightforward: (i) don’t do research in environmental economics 
since, all else equal, the reputation of the resulting papers will be much lower than in other 
fields; (ii) if you nevertheless decide to pursue environmental economic research, make it 
                                                 
9 Where two or more researchers had received identical numbers of citations, the ranks were assigned based on 
journal scores. (Alternatively, one could assign equal ranks to these individuals without changing the overall 
pattern of the results.) 
10 A similar argument applies to other fields of applied and interdisciplinary research fields such as health 
economics. 
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theoretical and highly technical since otherwise you are less likely to publish it in a 
respectable journal; (iii) don’t write publications for a broad environmental science audience 
(like that of the journal Environmental Science & Technology, for instance), since those 
articles will not count if you apply for a position at a traditional economics department or for 
funding of competitive economic research grants. 
These incentives are clearly not encouraging talented researchers to pursue applied 
environmental economic research that worries about cumbersome institutional details, realism 
of assumptions, or unwieldy distributional concerns. To the contrary, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the preference for highly abstract theoretical research at the “core” of the discipline, 
which is supported by the disciplinary standard, is a major reason for the limited contribution 
and success of the economic discipline in major environmental debates of our time. 
 
Conclusion 
Article citations – the standard measure of research output in many disciplines – are 
increasingly questioned as a sole indicator of research quality. The present study argues that 
journal reputation – the standard measure of research quality in economics – is even more 
problematic as a sole indicator of research output. 
The empirical analysis shows that, at the level of the individual researcher, there is a 
lack of consistent relationship between the standard measure of research output and citation 
rates. The result confirms the hypothesis that the pursuit of reputation as currently measured 
conflicts with the objective of academic relevance and interest (as measured by citations). 
Moreover, at the level of the journals, reputation within the discipline has very little to do 
with the impact on the literature. The relatively high impact of many environmental 
economics journals, for instance, contrasts sharply with their low reputation in the discipline. 
Together, these findings support the hypothesis that the standard measure of research output 
in economics does not adequately reflect the academic interest of economic research as 
measured by citation frequency. 
In addition, the standard measures based on journal reputation not only fail to 
adequately measure an individual researcher’s output. More importantly, due to tradeoffs 
between academic reputation and relevance they introduce powerful incentives against 
interesting and relevant work. They provide incentives for investments in detached theory, 
unfruitful technical sophistication, disciplinary isolation, and academic followership, which 
tend to be rewarded by that standard. 
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The experience of the financial crisis suggests that the existing merit system produces 
economic research that does not adequately address relevant real world issues (e.g. Krugman 
2009). If society is to further rely on economic advice in solving important economic and 
environmental problems, it needs to make sure that the assessment of economic research is 
not only based on the internal standard of an arguably complacent discipline but on (multiple) 
standards that also reflect the relevance and plausibility of the research for an interdisciplinary 
academic audience. One such standard is interdisciplinary article citations. 
Key players who can influence these standards include hiring committees at 
universities and national and international public research funding institutions (Nentwich 
2009). Responsible individuals in these institutions should re-examine existing practices in 
research evaluation and abandon the heavy reliance on subjective disciplinary measures of 
journal reputation in the evaluation of economic research. If these institutions do not (or 
cannot) initiate the necessary changes, the changes would need to be encouraged by the 
governments funding the research institutions. 
12 
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Table 1. Problematic characteristics of output measures, resulting incentives, and relevance of 
the problem (+) for measures based on journal reputation and article citations. 
Problematic characteristic Resulting incentives 
Economic 
journal 
reputation 
Article 
citations 
Blind to relevance outside 
academia 
Incentive for irrelevant “ivory tower” 
research 
+ + 
Reward for “fashionable” 
topics (in review stage or 
after publication) 
Incentive for publication of 
superficially interesting results, herd 
behaviour 
+ + 
Measurement at group 
(journal) rather than 
individual (article) level  
Incentive for wasteful investments in 
repeated submissions to top journals 
with high rejection rates 
+  
Quality appraisal only 
during review process 
Incentive for “pleasing” rather than 
innovative research 
+  
Inappropriate reward for 
technicality/sophistication 
Incentive for wasteful investments in 
technical sophistication 
+  
Exclusion of work in other 
disciplines 
Disincentive for collaboration with 
other disciplines 
+  
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Table 2. Proportion of variation in citations explained by journal reputation scores (R2-values 
and P-values from linear regression models). 
Sample n R2 P-value 
All articles    
   Full sample 200 0.307 <0.001 
   Top 10 percent of scores omitted 180 0.078 0.001 
   Top 20 percent of scores omitted 160 0.033 0.021 
Articles in 2004-2008    
   Full sample 100 0.108 <0.001 
   Top 10 percent of scores omitted   90 0.066 0.014 
   Top 20 percent of scores omitted   80 0.025 0.163 
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Table 3. Environmental economics journals: traditional journal weights and impact factors. 
Journal Combes / 
Linnemer  
Tinbergen 
list  
Handelsblatt 
ranking 2008  
Citation report 
2008 
 Weight 
(0.17 to 1)  
Rating 
(B to AA)  
Weight 
(0.1 to 1) 
Rank 
(a)  
Impact 
(5-year)b 
Rank 
(1-208) 
J. Env. Econ. Mgt. 0.5  A 0.5 36  2.6 24 
Land Econ. 0.5  B 0.4 62  1.7 52 
Am. J. Agr. Econ. 0.5  B 0.4 62  1.5 67 
Energy Econ. 0.33  B 0.3 97  2.7 21 
Env. Planning. A 0.33  B 0.3 97  2.2 -c 
Ecological Econ. 0.17  B 0.2 161  2.4 25 
Res. Energy Econ. 0.17  B 0.2 161  2.0 37 
Energy J. 0.17  - 0.2 161  1.9 44 
Eur. Rev. Agr. Ec. 0.2  B 0.2 161  1.7 53 
Env. Res. Econ. 0.33  - 0.2 161  1.5 70 
J. Agr. Econ. 0.33  - 0.2 161  1.3 81 
Agr. Econ. 0.17  - 0.2 161  0.9 111 
Env. Dev. Econ. -  - 0.2 161  0.9 -b 
Note: The table includes all Environmental Economics journals represented in the Handelsblatt 
ranking. 
a Entries are means of the rank bracket into which a journal falls. (Rank brackets for weights 
0.5, 0.4, 0.3 and 0.2 are: 26-45, 46-78, 79-115, 116-206, 207-220). 
b The respective 2-year-impact ranks are: 27, 73, 78, 15, -, 19, 69, 28, 74, 70, 54, 149. 
c Journal not included/ranked in Economics category. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between journal reputation score and number of citations in 2008: 
a) total journal score and citations to all articles; b) journal score based on 
articles published in 2004-2008 and citations to articles published in 2004-
2008. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between researcher rank based on journal reputation score and 
researcher rank based on citations: a) ranks based on total journal score and 
citations to all articles; b) ranks based on journal score based on articles 
published in 2004-2008 and citations to articles published in 2004-2008. 
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